The long-standing test that Canadian courts apply to evidence of causation is the “but for” test. The test, which is used for injury caused by one or more causes, requires the plaintiff to prove that the harm would not have occurred “without” the negligent act of the defendant. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has held in the past that, in certain exceptional circumstances, a court may apply the “material contribution” test instead of the “without” test. The “material contribution” test allows an injured party to avoid having to prove causation “otherwise” and requires only proof that the negligent act contributed significantly to the risk of harm. In Williams, the Privy Council essentially supported the Court of Appeal`s decision in Bailey, and it appears that the application of the “material contribution” is not extended only to cases where the respondent`s negligence contributed substantially to the cause of the actual injury suffered (i.e., the weakness of Bailey, which ultimately led to Ms. Bailey`s brain injury), but those in which neglect contributed significantly to the injury itself (i.e. damage to Mr. Williams` heart and lungs caused by the constant buildup of sepsis that lasted at least 2 hours and 20 minutes longer than it should have). Finally, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge erred in two respects, namely (i) that he should not have insisted that reconstructive scientific evidence was a necessary condition for establishing causation “had it not been”, and (ii) that he should not have applied the “substantial contribution to risk” test because the case did not fall within the scope of extraordinary circumstances, that allow its use.
The Supreme Court ordered that the case be reconsidered, with instructions that Mr. Clements` actions should be evaluated to determine causation on the basis of the “but for” test. The judge found that Mr. Clements` negligence contributed to Ms. Clements` injury. In determining liability, he used the “substantial contribution to risk” test to determine causation, as opposed to the usual “contribution to risk” test. He was of the view that Ms. Clements could not prove, on the basis of evidence, that her injuries would not have occurred “if Mr. Clements had negligently overloaded the motorcycle and driven too fast.” Given that Ms. Clements was unable to meet the standard of proof “had it been” only “through no fault of her own”, the trial judge found that there were exceptional circumstances justifying the application of the “material contribution” test.
Ms. Clements won her case in court. The Bermuda Court of Appeal disagreed with the result, concluding that the delay contributed significantly to myocardial ischemia. The Privy Council affirmed this decision approving Bailey v. MOD. With respect to successive events, the Privy Council stated (paragraph 39): “The sequence of events may be very relevant to consider as fact whether a subsequent event contributed substantially to the outcome (as illustrated by Hotson [1987] AC 750) or, conversely, if a previous event was so overtaken by subsequent events that it did not make a significant contribution to the outcome. But these are conclusive considerations. In principle, successive events are likely to make a significant contribution to the subsequent result. The judge came to the following conclusion: (1) if the damage is divisible, if the wrongful conduct made a (substantial) contribution to the damage, the defendant is liable to the extent of that contribution; 2. Where the damage is indivisible, the defendant is liable for all damage if it caused it, on the basis of the principle “but for”; 3. Where two perpetrators have jointly caused indivisible damage, the responsibility for which cannot be apportioned between them, each shall be liable for all damage suffered; and (4) in this case, the outcome of the death was indivisible and the material contribution was irrelevant: the court`s sole task was to “determine, after weighing the probabilities, whether the failure to begin administering intravenous antibiotics at 10:40 a.m. on the day of admission had caused his death,” and the judge did not consider that “a different legal doctrine might have come into play.” in this case.” The Bermuda Court of Appeal overturned the decision on the grounds that the delay in treatment had contributed “substantially” to Mr.
Williams` injuries. Read the last 27 news articles on the material contribution Compare this to wounds that turn out to be “divisible”. Tahir v. Haringey Health Authority [1998] is a good example. The judge noted that there had been a careless 3-hour delay in the treatment of a 15-year-old boy who had a spinal abscess that resulted in permanent paralysis. However, the plaintiff had not provided any evidence as to what his outcome would have been in these circumstances (his case was that the period of delay by negligence was 24 hours and that his injuries had been avoided in their entirety), and the Court of Appeal therefore overturned the judges` decision that the delay had caused £4,000 in damages. However, the Court of Appeal clearly recognized that the hospital is only liable for the portion of the damages caused by the negligent delay. PI and Clinical Negligence Analysis: The plaintiff filed a claim for negligence after suffering a stroke as a result of coronary angiography. The applicant had atrial fibrillation and was taking daily warfarin, which was discontinued four days before the angiogram and did not resume until two days later. The applicant argued that warfarin should not have been stopped for more than three days and that stopping treatment caused or contributed significantly to the stroke.
The Trust admitted that warfarin should have been resumed a day earlier, but otherwise admitted no violation and completely denied causation. Justice Soole ruled that the trust had not been breached beyond the scope of its licence. He dismissed the plaintiff`s action on the basis of a “but for” probability. He added that the material contribution was not applicable because there had been only one author and the stroke had been an indivisible injury. Written by David Juckes, lawyer at Hailsham Chambers. The central issue before the Supreme Court was the exceptional circumstances in which a court may apply the “material contribution” test instead of the causation test.