The distance between social justice and the concerns of ordinary people also results from its institutional orientation. As we know, for example, Rawls invites his readers to disregard the specifics of their own lives (e.g., talents, class, family, race, gender, etc.) in order to enter into a hypothetical point of view – the original position – and to consider justice impartially behind this “veil of ignorance”. But as pleasing as it may be to an impartial bystander, justice is a virtue rooted in the lives of real people who must act for reasons they can integrate into a life that is good for themselves and their communities, regardless of what ideal justice may require. While many things behind the veil of ignorance seem unfair, as Aristotle understood, fairness is part of justice, not at all. Justice is a virtue: it does not have to encompass all virtues. Public confidence as the basis of the rule against bias is also expressed in the oft-quoted words of Lord Hewart, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that “it is not only of some importance, but also fundamental that justice should not only be done, but should obviously be regarded as done”. [16] The foundation of impartiality is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. The erosion of public trust undermines the nobility of the legal system and leads to chaos. [14] The nature of the necessity of impartiality was established by Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, in Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon (1968):[15] “Justice must be rooted in trust and trust is destroyed when the righteous go away thinking, `The judge was biased.` [15]: 599 In Singapore, the right to legal representation depends on the type of investigation. However, given that section 12 of the Constitution of Singapore guarantees equal protection of the law, it was suggested that more weight should be given to this procedural right to balance the requirement of concurrent effectiveness. [35]: 193–4 Natural justice allows a person to assert his or her right to adequate notice of the date, time and place of the hearing, as well as detailed notice of the matter to be satisfied.
[35] This information gives the individual sufficient time to effectively prepare his or her own case and respond to the complaint against him. In Cooper v. Wandsworth,[37] Chief Justice William Erle went so far as to state that Cooper`s failure to give notice and hear could be described as a form of abuse, since he had been treated as if he had played no role. [48] As Lord Mustill stated in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Doody (1993): “Since the person concerned cannot usually make valid submissions without knowing what factors may weigh against his or her interests, fairness will very often require that he or she be informed of the substance of the matter to be answered.” [49] [6]: 582 The right to a fair trial requires that individuals not be penalized by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations, unless they have been informed of the case in advance, given a fair opportunity to respond, and given an opportunity to present their own case. The mere fact that a decision affects rights or interests is sufficient to subject the decision to the procedures required by natural justice. In Europe, the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by Article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is intended to supplement, not replace, the common law. This is a stand-alone comment and not a response to the first and only comment here.
This is what I wrote to a friend: . The argument that the premise of equality and the desideratum of social justice require that we do not prefer our children to other children – what does this mean in practice? – shows the absurd logical conclusions to which a bloodless abstraction, detached from ordinary lived experience, can lead. This is largely why Rogers emphasizes the role of emotions in our moral vision and choices. I saw the guy, a philosophy professor. Natch, who wrote a book that defended this line in relation to the “equal treatment” of children, interviewed and tried to make this case. What struck me, among other things, is that, by pure logic and from a certain premise, who could argue against him as a matter of abstract argumentation? Something should be said. Read More » I think it`s a very thoughtful letter. There is a certain balance between justice and (perceived) social justice.
Ultimately, we need a just society that focuses on just laws against feelings and personal perception. I agree ccsientist above. Laws and justice can always be improved, but demolishing the whole system leads to anarchy and only helps anarchists and those who feed on what anarchy brings. The mere fact that the law gives a decision-maker a wide margin of discretion is not a reason to weaken the requirements of natural justice. In the context of the United Kingdom, this is illustrated by Ahmed v. H.M. Treasury (No. 1) (2010). [41] The Department of Finance had exercised the power to freeze the complainants` financial assets and economic resources on the basis that it had reasonable grounds to suspect that the complainants were persons who, under the Anti-terrorism (UN Measures) Regulations, 2006[42] and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations) Order, 2006,[43] were subject to the law of the United Nations of 1946[43] committed acts of terrorism, attempted to participate in or facilitated the commission of terrorism. [44] The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that, since the Al-Qaida Order did not provide for fundamental procedural fairness, it effectively deprived the persons designated under the Order of the fundamental right of access to a judicial remedy and that, therefore, the power conferred by the United Nations Act 1946 to make the Order was ultra vires.
[45] Nor is it the duty of a court to provide assistance if a party presents its case without legal assistance. In Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Prosecutor (1998),[65] the accused appeared in person before a magistrate and pleaded guilty. He subsequently applied to the High Court for criminal review, arguing that his plea was ambiguous because the judge had not informed him of the defences available to him. The Court stated:[65]:19 The moral judgment of the righteous draws our attention to the fact that the nomoi are deficient and therefore do not conform to a perfect standard of justice imperfectly rooted in the institutions of a political tradition. But attempts to transform existing institutions to live up to an ideal of justice can be quixotic or even dangerous if they are not based on nomoi. We must reconcile controversial ideals of justice with the very real risks of social change. This is one of the reasons why the righteous must publicly defend their proposals for reform and, if they want to convince, base their proposals on the ideals of a common political tradition.
Like Martin Luther King`s statements about the evils of segregation—statements deeply rooted in the highest ideals of American political (and religious) tradition—such propositions have the power to reform nomoi over time, if only they are heard and heeded. If a person refuses to be represented by counsel, a higher “standard” of natural justice cannot be expected. This was pronounced in Singapore in Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical Council (2008). [64] Dr. Ho, who had been charged with professional misconduct, decided to appear before Council in person and refused to cross-examine the Board`s key witness. He then argued that he should have been warned of the legal consequences if he had not been legally represented. The High Court rejected this argument, finding that he had not suffered any prejudice.
Dr. Ho had a fair chance to present his own arguments and, most importantly, he was not denied the right to cross-examine witnesses. Now, according to natural justice, change—at least salutary change—occurs because of the right person trying to change the nomoi, not by reference to ideal justice, but by reforming the existing nomoi in a way that improves on the existing political tradition. This shift in individual judgment eventually becomes widespread enough to change the nomoi, and eventually brings society, albeit slowly and uncertainly, closer to something closer to ideal justice.